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GENERAL

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1. Embassy Moscow's analysis of Stalin interview--US Embassy Moscow, in commenting on the 16 February Stalin interview in Pravda, expresses the view that the most significant aspect of the interview is the discussion of the inevitability of war. Pointing out that Stalin declared war can become inevitable if "the deception practiced by warmongers" is successful, the Embassy remarks that this constitutes a notice to the Soviet people and others that war is a possibility.

The Embassy considers that the interview as a whole may have been calculated to: (a) establish a favorable popular attitude toward the Soviet position prior to the prospective CFM exploratory talks; (b) give new momentum to the "peace drive" on the eve of the World Peace Council meeting; (c) demonstrate the "reasonableness and righteousness" of Soviet policy for the benefit of peoples in the Soviet orbit and wavering Communists abroad; (d) nourish popular dissatisfaction in the West over the economic burdens of rearmament; and (e) widen the split now evident in the UN between Asiatic and NATO countries.

The Embassy comments that in this interview Stalin has permitted his reputation for superior wisdom to become involved in much more sophistry than previously. This may reflect a greater degree of Soviet vulnerability on the issues involved; it may reveal a feeling on the part of Soviet leaders that Stalin's authority is the margin needed to assure popular support abroad for Soviet foreign policy; or it may reflect a Soviet belief that Stalin's intervention will cause sufficient confusion to pave the way for success in any adventure to be undertaken in the near future.

State Dept. review completed

DIA review
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Looking at the question of what strategy is desirable for the US and the "free world," in the light of Stalin's pronouncements, the Embassy observes that Stalin has attempted to regain a measure of the diplomatic initiative wrested from him through effective inauguration of a Western defense program and that it is consequently important that the program be continued vigorously.

EUROPE

2. YUGOSLAVIA: Tito warns Communists to accept policy--
US Embassy Belgrade, in commenting on a speech by Tito before a Communist Party group, notes that Tito warned Yugoslav Communists to accept Yugoslav foreign policy and declared that dissension on this point "would not be tolerated." The Embassy observes that there is probably a minority among Yugoslav Communists who find it difficult to accept a Yugoslav-Western rapprochement and that this speech was aimed at such elements. The Embassy has long felt some danger that Tito, in reorienting the Yugoslav Government toward the West, might get too far ahead of the Communist Party. It is now apparent that the Party leadership is aware of the problem and has taken steps to meet it.

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FAR EAST

3. CHINA: Reported Russian military control in Peiping--
The US Air Attache in Taipei transmits a report from a source in Peiping that Russian officials there called a meeting on 6 February of the Chinese responsible for

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garrison control of the Peiping area and told the Chinese that the military control in the Peiping area was too weak. The Chinese Commander reportedly stood up to defend his position and was told to sit down and shut up. According to this report, the Chinese were then told that a Russian Commander would give orders in the Peiping area in the future. The Chinese made no open protest but deeply resent such control by the Russians.

Source also reported that several Chinese representatives who returned to Peiping from the recent Moscow Conference said that the Korean cease-fire discussions have closed, with the conclusion that no further cease-fire proposal will be presented to the UN.

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